

Raspberry Pi Honeygot + Cloudflare + Cowrie  
Full Runbook, Issues, and Fixes  
(Compiled from multi-day setup + debugging)

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## 0. HIGH-LEVEL ARCHITECTURE

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- Device: Raspberry Pi running Debian / Raspberry Pi OS (64bit)
- Role: Exposed “honeypot” for students to SSH into via a web browser
- Exposure: Cloudflare Tunnel + Cloudflare Access (Browser SSH)
- Honeygot engine: Cowrie SSH honeypot
- Real SSH:
  - Pi’s real SSH daemon listens on the normal SSH port (for you only).
  - Cowrie listens on TCP port 2222 on localhost.
- Cloudflare Tunnel:
  - Public hostname: honeypot.void-nano.uk
  - Service: ssh://localhost:2222
  - Cloudflared runs as a systemd service and connects your Pi to Cloudflare’s edge.
- User Flow:
  1. Student browses to honeypot.void-nano.uk
  2. Cloudflare Access prompts for email / OTP, enforces policy.
  3. After auth, Access opens a Browser SSH session to the service defined on the tunnel.
  4. Cloudflare connects to your tunnel, your tunnel forwards to localhost:2222.
  5. Cowrie accepts the SSH connection and presents the fake filesystem + challenge.

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## 1. CLOUDFLARE TUNNEL CONFIGURATION

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### 1.1 Tunnel config on the Pi

/etc/cloudflared/config.yml:

```
tunnel: a6e5db48-8c89-4bf3-b2b2-0c707af29d2f
credentials-file: /etc/cloudflared/a6e5db48-8c89-4bf3-b2b2-0c707af29d2f.json
```

```
ingress:
  - hostname: honeypot.void-nano.uk
    service: ssh://localhost:2222
  - service: http_status:404
```

Key change over time:

- tcp://localhost:22 → tcp://localhost:2222 → ssh://localhost:2222 (final)

Restart after changes:

```
sudo systemctl restart cloudflared
systemctl status cloudflared
```

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## 2. CLOUDFLARE ACCESS APPLICATION

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Application: "Honeypot SSH"

- Type: Self-hosted
- URL: honeypot.void-nano.uk

Public hostname:

- Subdomain: honeypot
- Domain: void-nano.uk
- Path: (blank)

Browser rendering:

- Allow automatic Cloudflared auth: ON
- Browser rendering: SSH

Policy:

- Name: Allow SSH Access
- Action: Allow
- Include: Everyone (for class)

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## 3. COWRIE SERVICE + PORT

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Service:

```
sudo systemctl status cowrie
```

Expect:

```
Active: active (running)
Main PID: (twistd)
```

Port:

```
sudo ss -tulpn | grep 2222
```

Should show twistd listening on 0.0.0.0:2222

Control:

```
sudo systemctl start cowrie
sudo systemctl stop cowrie
sudo systemctl restart cowrie
```

Test locally:

```
ssh -p 2222 root@localhost
```

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## 4. COWRIE HONEYFS + FS.PICKLE

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Key directories:

```
/home/cowrie/cowrie/honeyfs      (fake filesystem tree)
/home/cowrie/cowrie/src/cowrie/data/fs.pickle (compiled FS index)
```

Config snippets in etc/cowrie.cfg:

```
[honeypot]
data_path = src/cowrie/data
filesystem = ${honeypot:data_path}/fs.pickle
```

Important rule:

- Any time honeyfs changes, you must rebuild fs.pickle.

Rebuild procedure (the correct one we settled on):

```
cd /home/cowrie/cowrie
sudo systemctl stop cowrie
sudo -u cowrie cowrie-env/bin/createfs -l honeyfs -d 6 -o src/cowrie/data/fs.pickle
sudo systemctl start cowrie
```

We originally deleted wrong fs.pickle copies which caused:

- SystemExit: 2 inside cowrie.ssh.fs
- Browser SSH errors: “Unable to open channel...” or “Origin closed...”

Regenerating with the above command fixed it.

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## 5. CTF FILE LAYOUT INSIDE HONEYFS

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honeyfs tree (simplified):

```
honeyfs/
etc/
  cron.d/
  sys-update
  ...
home/
  admin/
  flag.txt (decoy flag)
  student/
  notes.txt (hints)
proc/ (fake /proc files)
tmp/
.cache/
.data.b64
```

```
.exfil
usr/
  local/
    bin/
      update-system
share/
  .cache/
    .system/
      .exfil_flag
var/
  log/
    auth.log
    syslog
```

Key file contents:

```
/etc/cron.d/sys-update
```

```
* * * * * root /usr/local/bin/update-system
```

```
/home/admin/flag.txt
```

```
flag{this-is-not-the-real-flag}
```

```
/home/student/notes.txt
```

```
Our admin keeps sensitive info in /tmp/.cache
I saw something about base64 and "bad credentials" last time.
```

```
/var/log/auth.log
```

```
Nov 16 04:10:23 sshd[2222]: Failed password for admin from 185.222.81.21 port 55812
Nov 16 04:10:24 sshd[2222]: Failed password for admin from 185.222.81.21 port 55812
Nov 16 04:10:24 sshd[2222]: Failed password for student from 185.222.81.21 port 55812
Nov 16 04:10:25 sshd[2222]: Accepted password for backup from 185.222.81.21 port 55812
Nov 16 04:10:26 sshd[2222]: session opened for user backup
```

```
/usr/local/bin/update-system
```

```
#!/bin/bash
# fake malware - runs via cron
# exfiltrates secret flag from a hidden location
cat /usr/share/.cache/.system/.exfil_flag >> /tmp/.cache/.exfil
echo "sent" > /tmp/.cache/status
```

Hidden flag & exfil files in honeypots:

```
sudo mkdir -p honeypots/tmp/.cache
sudo mkdir -p honeypots/usr/share/.cache/.system
```

```
sudo tee honeypots/usr/share/.cache/.system/.exfil_flag >/dev/null << 'EOF'
```

```
flag{intrusion-chain-master}  
EOF
```

```
sudo tee honeyfs/tmp/.cache/.exfil >/dev/null << 'EOF'  
flag{intrusion-chain-master}  
EOF
```

```
sudo tee honeyfs/tmp/.cache/.data.b64 >/dev/null << 'EOF'  
YmFkX2NyZWRIbnRpYWxzPTRmMzMzMzQzZjMyCg==  
EOF
```

After editing these, we ran createfs again as above.

```
=====  
6. HOW STUDENTS SOLVE THE CTF  
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```

Inside Browser SSH, as root@svr04:

1) Enumerate:

```
ls  
ls /home  
ls /home/student  
cat /home/student/notes.txt
```

2) Check auth log:

```
cat /var/log/auth.log
```

See admin / student failures, backup success.

3) Check syslog (story of malware install, cron, tmp paths):

```
cat /var/log/syslog
```

4) Look in /tmp/.cache:

```
cd /tmp  
ls  
cd .cache  
ls -al
```

5) Decode base64:

```
cat .data.b64  
echo "YmFkX2NyZWRIbnRpYWxzPTRmMzMzMzQzZjMyCg==" | base64 -d
```

Gets:

```
bad_credentials=4f32f343f32
```

6) Grab the final flag:

```
cat .exfil
```

Flag:

```
flag{intrusion-chain-master}
```

```
=====
```

## 7. BUGS & HOW WE FIXED THEM

```
=====
```

### 7.1 Cowrie “SystemExit: 2” / PermitTTY error

Symptom:

- journalctl -u cowrie showed SystemExit in fs.HoneyPotFilesystem
- Browser SSH: “Unable to open channel, ensure PermitTTY is enabled”

Cause:

- Missing or invalid fs.pickle after deleting wrong file.

Fix:

```
cd /home/cowrie/cowrie
sudo systemctl stop cowrie
sudo -u cowrie cowrie-env/bin/createfs -l honeyfs -d 6 -o src/cowrie/data/fs.pickle
sudo systemctl start cowrie
```

### 7.2 “The origin has unexpectedly closed the connection”

Cause:

- Either cloudflared down or cowrie not responding.

Fix checklist:

```
systemctl status cloudflared
systemctl status cowrie
sudo journalctl -u cowrie -n 50
# fix fs.pickle if needed, restart services.
```

### 7.3 Files exist in honeyfs but students can't see them

Cause:

- You edited honeyfs but did NOT rebuild fs.pickle.

Fix:

- Run createfs (see above).

#### 7.4 update-system “command not found” inside honeypot

- In Cowrie, scripts are static, not always executable in a real sense.
- That’s okay for this CTF – we pre-created /tmp/.cache/.exfil and .data.b64 so the story still works without actual cron execution.

```
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```

### 8. LIVE LOGS ON YOUR END

```
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```

Cowrie logs directory:

```
/home/cowrie/cowrie/var/log/cowrie
```

Files:

```
cowrie.log    (text)
cowrie.json   (JSON)
```

Follow live:

```
cd /home/cowrie/cowrie/var/log/cowrie
sudo tail -f cowrie.log
```

Systemd logs:

```
sudo journalctl -u cowrie -f
sudo journalctl -u cloudflared -f
```

```
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```

### 9. SAFE POWER-OFF / PERSISTENCE

```
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```

Shutdown the Pi cleanly:

```
sudo shutdown now
# or
sudo poweroff
```

On next boot:

- cloudflared.service and cowrie.service are enabled.
- They should automatically start.
- Verify:

```
systemctl status cloudflared
systemctl status cowrie
```

```
=====
```

## 10. QUICK COMMAND CHEAT SHEET

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### Rebuild FS:

```
cd /home/cowrie/cowrie
sudo systemctl stop cowrie
sudo -u cowrie cowrie-env/bin/createfs -l honeypfs -d 6 -o src/cowrie/data/fs.pickle
sudo systemctl start cowrie
```

### Check services:

```
systemctl status cloudflared
systemctl status cowrie
```

### View live Cowrie log:

```
cd /home/cowrie/cowrie/var/log/cowrie
sudo tail -f cowrie.log
```

### Final flag (for your notes):

```
flag{intrusion-chain-master}
```